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The Muslim Minority of the
Democratic Republic of Congo
From Historic Marginalization and Internal Division to Collective Action
La communauté musulmane minoritaire de la République démocratique du
Congo. De la marginalisation historique et de la division interne à l’action
collective
Ashley E. Leinweber
1 The  Muslim  minority  community  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  represents
approximately ten  percent  of  the  total  Congolese  population.  The  history  of  the
community,  from  its  origins  in  the  pre-colonial  era  to  Belgian  domination,  can  be
characterized  as  one  of  repression  and  marginalization.  Further  compounding  the
struggles of  Congo’s Muslim minority have been intense internal  conflicts within the
community in the post-independence period. This article examines the strife within the
Muslim  community  at  three  levels:  local,  provincial,  and  national.  In  the  Maniema
province, the historic birthplace of Islam in the Congo and still home to the majority of
Congolese Muslims today, evidence comes from the provincial capital of Kindu, where
Muslims  approximate  twenty-five  percent  of  the  population,  and  Kasongo,  where
Muslims constitute a clear majority of between eighty and ninety percent. For a broader
understanding of contemporary Congolese Muslims, we look to comparative data from
Kisangani, the capital of the Oriental province, where Muslims are a minority of about
fifteen percent of the population, as well as the Congolese capital, Kinshasa.
2 This  article  will  demonstrate  how the evolution of  the Muslim minority  mirrors  the
turbulent political history of the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, as the country
has experienced immense change since 2003 in the democratizing post-conflict period, so
too has the Congolese Muslim community demonstrated a drastic change from the past as
well,  despite  their  history  of  disunity.  The community  now boasts  a  strong national
leadership,  there  are  a  growing  number  of  Muslim  associations,  and  the  Congolese
Muslim minority has begun to act collectively as a player in the politics of re-building
post-conflict Congo. Perhaps most telling about the mobilization of the Muslim minority
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community  in  recent  years,  has  been  their  role  in  providing  the  public  service  of
education, as will be described in the final section.
 
Background: Marginalization of the Muslim Minority in
Colonial Congo
3 Muslims in the Congo are a small minority group (comprising about ten percent of the
country’s people) living in an overwhelmingly Christian nation where Catholics comprise
fifty  percent  of  the  total  Congolese  population,  Protestants  twenty  percent  and
Kimbanguists  ten  percent  (US Dept.  State  2010).  The  Congolese  Muslim  minority
community has struggled against foreign domination and exclusion. Islam originated in
eastern Congo in the pre-colonial period as Swahili-Arab traders from the east African
coast,  especially  the  historical  figure  of  Tippo Tip,  penetrated  the  interior  as  far  as
present-day Maniema province in search of ivory and slaves (Alpers 1975; Brode 1969;
Renault 1987). Their goal was not islamization, but economic in nature. However, the
local communities began to emulate the foreigners and many adopted the new religion.
4 In the early 1890s, the Swahili-Arabs were defeated by the Belgian colonial forces and
expelled from Eastern Congo.  The new colonial  regime was hostile toward Congolese
Muslims, fearing a threat to the regime and rebellion by the minority which represented
“a potential breeding ground of insurrection politically” (Young 1969: 256). As such, the
Muslims remained underground to avoid reprisals from colonial authorities. However, as
the  result  of  increased  interaction  with  the  outside  Muslim world  in  the  early  XXth
century,  the  community  began to  witness  a  resurgence.  Most  importantly  the  1920s
brought the proselytizing efforts of the Mulidi movement led by Muslims from Tanzania
who promoted the spread of the Qadiriyya Sufi order. More mosques and Qur’anic schools
were built, and men were sent for Islamic education abroad in order to teach upon their
return. The colonial regime reacted harshly to this new religious activity by forbidding
Muslim foreigners from entering the country, destroying several mosques, and outspoken
and potentially rebellious leaders were uprooted from their communities and relegated
to distant locations of the vast Congo territory (Lazzarato 2001: 44).
5 Beyond forced exile and mosque destruction, the arena where most Congolese Muslims
experienced marginalization during the colonial era was in education. Most schools were
run by the Catholic Church, which systematically attempted to counter the spread of
Islam. In contemporary interviews with Congolese Muslims, they detail how they, their
parents, and/or grandparents were forced to convert, eat pork, and drink water during
the fasting month of  Ramadan in order to prove their  loyalty to the Church and be
eligible for attending school1. Therefore, most Muslim parents forbid their children from
attending school  in order  to avoid conversion to Christianity,  leaving generations of
Congolese Muslims uneducated, unable to speak the administrative French language, and
therefore marginalized from bureaucratic posts and involvement with state institutions.
Traces of this legacy can still be seen today in the under-representation of Muslims at all
levels of Congolese government and advanced professional posts. For instance, after the
2006 elections at the national level, there were only four Muslims in the five hundred-
person assembly and three out  of  one hundred twenty Senators.  Of  the  twenty-four
deputies in the provincial assembly of the Maniema province, which boasts the largest
Muslim population, none are Muslims.
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6 However,  the  end of  colonial  rule  marked a  big  change  for  previously  marginalized
Muslims as their situation improved with Congolese independence. Freedom of religion
was  guaranteed by  law in  1960  and enshrined in  the  constitution of 1964.  The  first
national Muslim conference was held in the Maniema province in March 1964 with the
purpose of selecting an official representative to interact with the state. Despite their
increased political freedoms, the post-independence period led to a new kind of hardship
for  the  minority  community.  Instead  of  facing  an  external  threat  in  the  form  of  a
repressive and suspicious colonial regime, Muslims now faced myriad internal conflicts.
As one Congolese informant acknowledged, “division kills the community at all levels”2.
In the sections to follow we will examine the internal conflict at local, provincial, and
national levels within the Muslim minority of Congo.
 
Internal Conflict among Maniema Muslims
7 The  internal  division  within  the  Muslim community  of  Congo  is  reflective  of  much
boarder trends in the Muslim world.  Scholarship on Islam in sub-Saharan Africa has
focused  on  a  primary  cleavage  within  Muslim  communities  as  between  Sufis  and
Reformers.  However,  this classic distinction is  too simple;  and as the contributors to
African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists show, the internal
dynamics  of  most  Muslim  groups  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  are  much  more  complex
(Westerlund  &  Evers  Rosander  1997).  As  such,  today  most  scholars  recognize  “the
limitations of the Sufi-Islamist dichotomy and the need to nuance our analyses” (Villalón
2007: 163). Numerous scholarly accounts exist that demonstrate these nuances through
an examination of the empirical data of internal Sufi/Reformist conflicts from specific
locations in Africa3. Not surprisingly, when examining the internal dynamics within the
Congolese Muslim community, the Sufi/Reformist tensions are apparent, yet also become
more nuanced by local variations.  For example, different actors in different locations
have  referred  to  the  conflict  as  one  between  the  Tariqa  and  the  Tawahidi;  Wenyeji
(autochtones or natives) against newcomers Wazalia (non-autochtones, of Arab descent);
or  arabisés and  non  arabisés; as  a  generational  dispute;  and  between  prominent
businessmen and trained Islamic theologians.
8 The internal disputes within the Muslim community in the Maniema province of eastern
Congo largely conform to the Sufi/Reformist dichotomy. However, local manifestations of
this vary, as divergent communities sometimes express their conflicts as stemming from
ethnic,  leadership,  origin,  or  generational  differences.  But  in  Maniema  the  Muslim
community’s internal conflict exists primarily between two conflicting groups, known
locally as “Tariqa” and “Tawahidi”. The term tarîqa means path and is clearly Sufi, while
tawahid refers to the unity or oneness of God that is a constant theme of Reformists/
Salafists. In the Congo, members of the Tariqa often represent the descendants of the
Swahili-Arabs, also known as arabisés and non-autochtones. The Tawahidi is comprised of
those who insist they are following the correct path of the Prophet Mohammed, and
resemble  Reformers/Islamists.  In  the  classic  critique  of  Sufism,  the  Tawahidi  group
accuses the Tariqa of bid’a, innovation, for the Sufi rituals they follow.
9 The origin of the Tariqa in Maniema is tied to many other Sufis in Africa: they are a part
of the Qadiriyya Sufi order. As mentioned previously, this movement made its way from
Zanzibar into southern Maniema in the 1920s-1930s and was received with great hostility
by the Belgian regime. The author of a local thesis described classic Sufi practices: in
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order to become a member one must go through the stages of training for a murid, or
novice, and follow the tariqa, or mystic road (Lazzarato 2001: 50). Currently in the region,
however, some ambiguity exists in practice, as reflected in one informant’s comments.
When asked if the Tariqa are Sufi, he said, referring presumably to their practices, that in
some areas they are, but not really in Maniema4. However, he described how recently
some Tariqa members have become more involved in “Sufi” practices, such as a man in
Kindu who has begun a Sufi  prayer on Fridays,  and zikri,  night prayers,  occurring in
Kinshasa.
10 One of the main sources of contention between the two groups has been debate over
burial rituals. The Tawahidi say that during the Prophet’s time only men accompanied
the body and did so in complete silence. The Tariqa allow women to join the procession
and for the community to sing. The Tawahidi say that to speak or sing while walking with
the dead person is bid’a, but the Tariqa counter this by arguing that a Hadith revealed that
Mohammed went to three funerals in one day, at one of which they sang the Qur’an and
the Prophet said that it was okay. Another source of contention between the two groups
in Maniema is the celebration of the birth of the Prophet, the Mawlidi. The Tawahidi say
this is unacceptable, but it has remained very popular among the Tariqa.
11 A third point of conflict between the groups is debate over the language used for Friday
prayer. The Tawahidi want the service to be a back and forth immediate translation from
Arabic  into  Swahili,  reflecting  a  broader Islamist  desire  for  local  language  so  that
individuals  can have deeper religious understanding.  The Tariqa,  on the other hand,
prefer  the  service  to  be  in  uninterrupted  Arabic,  followed  by  the  prayer,  and then
translated into Swahili. This reflects Sufi/traditionalist advocacy for the use of Arabic so
that people rely on the local leadership as intermediaries.
12 According  to  an  informant  who  is  a  prominent  member  of  the  Maniema  Muslim
community, the conflict between the two groups has been going on for a long time, even
before the creation of the national Muslim association in 19725. He noted that at some
moments the conflict  became so intense in Kasongo and Kindu that members of  the
different groups did not pray in one another’s mosques and almost all dialogue between
the groups ceased. In his perspective however, relations are improving and people are
free  to  worship  anywhere.  There  are  indeed  significant  suggestions  that  the  long-
entrenched conflict  among Maniema Muslims  is  evolving,  and that  they  are  moving
toward increased collective action as a group, as can be seen in the local cases of Kindu
and Kasongo.
 
Internal Conflict in Kindu
13 In Kindu, the capital city of the Maniema province that contains approximately twenty-
five percent Muslims, the community’s internal conflicts are between the two religious
groups described above. When the conflict was more acute members did not go to one
another’s  mosques.  The  Tawahidi  group primarily  frequented  the  central  mosque  of
Kindu,  while  the  mosque  associated  with  the  Tariqa  was  located  in  the  Baceko
neighborhood. A key Tariqa informant shared his personal experience of having to go to
Baceko on the other side of town to pray, but describes how in recent years he is welcome
to pray at the central mosque again6. This example highlights the larger phenomenon of
the easing of tensions between the two groups.
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14 This dynamic of reduced tensions in the post-conflict democratizing era may be seen as
an effort to rally a minority community together for collective action. Thus, a Sheikh
whose organization is  building a Muslim private secondary school  in Kindu and who
studied abroad in the United Arab Emirates, notes that he did not return to Congo to try
to  change  Islam,  but  to  help  with  development7.  He  laments  that  the  majority  of
Congolese who studied abroad do not return to help their native communities but instead
seek more comfortable livelihoods in Europe or the United States. Although descriptions
of Reformers with Arab training from other parts of the continent suggest an emphasis
on returning home in order to teach “pure” Islam, the Sheikh emphasized his preference
not to get involved with religious debates because of a fear of conflict, but instead puts
his focus on his family and development projects like the school. He noted that most local
sheikhs and imams in Maniema did not have the opportunity to study abroad, although
some did travel to Kigoma, Tanzania for Qur’anic education. Reflecting Islamist critiques
of Sufi “traditionalists”, however, he argues that their lack of education is the reason why
they do not have an “idea of development”.
15 In addition to the classic  Tariqa/Tawahidi  tension, other local  issues,  such as  ethnic
divisions, further complicate internal dynamics. For example, the President of Comité
national féminin (CONAFEM), the national organization of Muslim women, visited Kindu in
2006 in order to create unity within the Maniema Muslim women’s community8.  She
expressed that there had been difficult internal divisions in Maniema, primarily fueled by
disagreements among the Muslim men, but that her visit was successful because they
were  able  to  create  a  provincial  level  organization  and select  a  woman  to  lead  it.
However, the newly elected leader did receive some opposition from those who believed
the leader should come from Kasongo and not Kindu, but this opposition was based more
on ethnic tensions than religious beliefs.
16 Another local issue of concern for Muslims in Kindu is the popular contestation over the
leadership of  their  community.  There are complaints about  the hereditary nature of
granting leadership to local imams. For example, a Muslim man who works for a peasant
rights group and describes himself  as  a researcher and an activist,  advocates for his
community to fight the corruption of old leaders so that people trained in development
can also become leaders9. As will be discussed in more detail in a later section on national
level conflicts within the Muslim community, this is precisely what occurred as the result
of the national Muslim association’s General Assembly in 2009.
 
Internal Conflict in Kasongo
17 The division between the two Muslim groups is most pronounced and documented in
Kasongo, the second largest city in the Maniema province after Kindu and the birthplace
of  Islam in the Congo.  It  is  the community  with the largest  Muslim majority  where
Muslims constitute approximately eighty percent of the population. A work about the
local  Muslim  community  of  Kasongo  describes  its  tensions  along  the  classic  Sufi/
Reformist  dichotomy:  one group known as  reformists  or  wana Tawhid (people  of  the
Tawahidi) who seek renovation and progress but in returning to a more orthodox Islam,
while they label the other group as comprised of “traditionalists”/“conservatives”/watu
wa bid’a (Lazzarato 2001: 103-104). The Tawahidi seek to get rid of what they pejoratively
label as the innovations of the other group, encourage the use of Swahili during prayer,
are associated with the Central Mosque and are considered “children of the country”. The
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second group is part of the Mulidi (what others call Tariqa), celebrate the birth of the
Prophet, prefer the use of Arabic, and are the descendants of wazalia or Swahili-Arabs. In
Kasongo the Tariqa are associated with Mosque 18.
18 In the local context of Kasongo, this Sufi/Reformist division is further complicated by the
historical origins of the Muslim community. In the 1960s there was a quarrel between
Mosque 18 and people in other parts of town, so a new Central Mosque was built.  A
Catholic  priest  who  was  raised  Muslim  describes  the  conflict  at  the  base  of  the
construction of the new Mosque as between wazalia (non-autochtones, non-natives) and
wenyeji (autochtones or natives) (Tata 2003: 68). The wazalia are the descendants of those
who were directly in contact with the Swahili-Arabs and refer to the neighborhood near
Mosque 18 as the “groupement arabisé”, whereas wenyeji are tribes who were located in
Kasongo even before the first foreigners arrived. Tata describes the wazalia as having an
air of superiority and claiming that they helped to “civilize” the others. In response to
this conflict, the wenyeji constructed the new mosque in an effort to detach from what
they viewed as the more “orthodox” Islam of Mosque 18.
19 The former Secretary General of the national Muslim association from September 2004,
who  is  a  member  of  the  Qadiriyya,  sees  the  internal  conflict  as  one  between  the
“autochtones” (“natives”)  against  newcomers 10.  In his  account,  this  division led to the
creation of the Central Mosque by the autochtones. The other main mosques in Kasongo
are Mosques 17 and 18, which are affiliated with the Tariqa, while the newer mosque is
Tawahidi. However, the former Secretary General believes these conflicts are not truly
spiritual in nature, but revolve around other issues that people claim are spiritual. The
true underlying causes are most likely political in nature and reflect leadership tensions
and efforts to garner the support of the largest segments of the Muslim population.
20 Nevertheless, the discourse reflects classic critiques of Sufism, such as members of the
Central Mosque accusing those of Mosque 18 of bid’a, particularly around the celebration
of the Prophet’s birthday. The controversy became so considerable for a time that people
stopped visiting and greeting one another and it even caused some couples to divorce.
Tata (2003: 68-69) also describes many smaller conflicts present in Kasongo, such as the
timing  of  the  end  of  Ramadan.  Language  represents a  source  of  conflict  within  the
community, as they debate the issue of the translation of the Qur’an into local language
and in what order Arabic and Swahili should be used during the liturgy. Debates about
the language of the Qur’an are representative of the larger Sufi/Reformist schism, as the
case of the use of Swahili in East Africa has demonstrated (Lacunza-Balda 1997: 95).
21 An important source of contention that reflects Sufi/Reformist tensions but with local
variety comes from generational issues, as some Muslim youth of Kasongo have gone to
study theology in Egypt or Saudi Arabia and come back critical of how Islam is practiced
in Kasongo. In an informal conversation with a twenty-year-old Sheikh whose father runs
Mosque 18 in Kasongo, he describes the division within the Muslim community not in
terms of Tariqa or Tawahidi, but as a division between old and young people11. He is one
of the few Muslim youth in Kasongo who has graduated from secondary school and also
has received extensive training in the Qur’an, granting him the title of “Sheikh”. In his
opinion the Muslim leadership should be drawn from the younger generation, such as
himself, who are educated in both the Qur’an and in French and have the ability to help
the  Muslim  community  advance.  He  asks  how  the  current  leaders  can  talk  to  the
governor, foreigners, or other important people when most visitors do not speak Swahili
or  Arabic?  Similar  to  sentiments  expressed by informants  in Kindu,  he believes  that
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Muslims  need  leaders  who  speak  French  and  are  focused  on  their  community’s
development in order for them to truly evolve. His views reflect a Reformist attempt to
modernize the Muslim community.
22 Local scholars lament that one result of all of these internal conflicts within the Muslim
community of Kasongo is an inability to unite for development purposes (Tata 2003: 69).
They cite the absence of a common treasury to be used for development projects and that
plans for the creation of  an Islamic bureau of development still  have not born fruit.
During a meeting with the women of Mosque 18 it became apparent that the divisions
within the community do not just involve the male leadership12. The women’s association,
as all other associations, requested assistance to find an international organization that
can  provide  financial  assistance  for  their  development  projects.  However,  they  also
stressed that there are three different women’s organizations in town, one associated
with each of the three main mosques, and that any funding secured should come to them
and not be designated for the women of Kasongo more broadly, implying that they do not
work well together.
23 Tellingly, however, despite providing examples of the tensions within their community,
Maniema Muslim informants also argue that they believed such conflicts were on the
wane, and instead emphasize the Islamic community’s unity. For example, the former
Secretary General emphasized that the conflict is better now largely because mosques are
all now what he called more “moderate”. The BIDH president who lives in Kindu and is a
member of the Tariqa recounts that he used to be forbidden to go to the central mosque,
but that the last time he visited Kasongo he was able to do so13. These statements reflect
the evolution of a pattern found in other African Muslim communities: the prevalence of
Sufism, the rise of Reformism, a period of tension between the two, and the eventual
blurring of distinction between the categories.  However, in the particular case of the
Congo, it also reflects the continuous attempt in recent years to mobilize the Muslim
minority for collective action purposes within the broader state context. Evidence from
outside of the Maniema province reveals similar processes occurring, with their own local
essence.
 
Contentious Internal Politics in Kisangani
24 The broader phenomenon of internal conflict within the Congolese Muslim community is
not only applicable to the Maniema province, but is also present in Kisangani, and the
Oriental  province  more  broadly.  Kisangani  contains  the  second  largest  Muslim
community in Congo outside of Maniema, at approximately fifteen percent of the city’s
population.  As in Maniema,  the concern with Muslim disunity is  strongly felt  in the
community. In an enlightening interview with a Sheikh who is the leader of Friday prayer
at the central mosque and also a professor of sociology at the University of Kisangani, he
expressed his views that the biggest problem facing his community and the reason they
are behind the other religious communities in terms of growth and development is due to
internal conflicts14. Interestingly, the conflicts within the Islamic community of Kisangani
are expressed by local Muslims as primarily a generational dispute. While the dispute in
Kisangani is not labeled as one between the Tariqa and the Tawahidi as in Maniema, the
Sheikh pointed out that the conflict in both is quite similar. At the heart of both is tension
between  those  who  want  to  remain  the  same  and  others  who  want  change  and
development. Thus, in his view, another way to classify the divisions within the Muslim
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community of Kisangani would be as between development advocates and those who
prefer  the  status  quo.  The  manner  in  which  he  represents  this  distinction  clearly
demonstrates Sufi/Reformist tensions present in the Kisangani region.
25 According to the Sheikh, there are two distinct groups, and they correspond to the two
large mosques, the central mosque and Centre islamique Nuuru el’Yaquini (CINY). Before
2001, there was only one main mosque in town, the central mosque, which was under the
management of the older generation. In the 1990s, the younger generation started to
demand changes and insist on their community becoming more involved in development.
Instead of yielding their leadership positions to members of the younger generation or
working out a power-sharing deal,  the older generation began construction of a new
mosque,  called  CINY,  which  was  completed  around  2003.  There  was  an  effort  at
cooperation  after  the  two  groups  returned  from  the  national  association  General
Assembly of 2004, where they had been reprimanded by others for their hostility toward
one another and encouraged to work together to solve their dilemmas. They formed a
new committee in which the top two positions were held by the older generation but the
youth  camp  was  granted  some  important  roles,  such  as  the  third  most  important
position.
26 However, the divisions between the two groups remained and could be seen most clearly
in joint meetings where opinions were divided along the two camps. They continued to
try to work together for a time, until a new dispute broke out over the construction of
new mosques. The older generation refused to compromise, so the youth camp quit the
committee and the two groups ended attempts at  reconciliation.  However,  as will  be
discussed later, the 2009 national General Assembly elections brought about change in
the form of the youth camp gaining positions of leadership. One might fear this power
reversal  would result  continuation of  tension between the two groups.  However,  the
Sheikh noted that the youth also included the older generation in several positions as
well. Thus, he believes that this change seems to have brought about a real reconciliation
between the two camps in Kisangani and Muslims now feel free to pray in any mosque.
This discourse by the Sheikh resembles efforts by Maniema Muslims to emphasize the
increasing unity of their minority community.
27 The coordinator for  Islamic public  schools  in the Oriental  province also laments  the
division among the community,  claiming it  has been its downfall15.  Noting that most
Muslims in Kisangani are Tariqa, he argues instead that the conflict stems from interest
groups that fight over positions of power within the community. He mentioned that there
are  two  large  groups  with  different  interests  and  that  for  a  long  time  the  Muslim
community of the province was ungovernable because the two groups were unable to
compromise.  In  speaking  about  these  groups,  the  coordinator  does  not  describe  the
conflict in generational terms, but nevertheless suggests that he believes young Muslims
feel ashamed because their community has not been able to assist the larger community
in comparison to Catholic and Protestant groups which have done much for development.
Therefore, the youth’s views he expresses are much in line with Reformist critiques of
Sufi mismanagement and the Reformist desire to be “modernizers”.
28 When  leaders  and  members  of  many  Muslim  associations  active  in  Kisangani  were
collectively asked why their community seems to be behind others in the development
arena,  they cited important  historical  reasons  such as  the  colonial  legacy of  lack of
education, which meant a dearth of Muslim leaders16. But in the contemporary era the
factor  they  insisted  as  having  significantly  impeded  the  advancement of  their
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community, in addition to these historical legacies, is internal divisions within their own
community. What is also interesting about these internal divisions within the Muslim
community is that they are not just perceived by Congolese Muslims themselves, but are
also acknowledged by their Christian neighbors. For example, a Christian agent at the
state  education office  for  Kisangani  schools,  who had been a  top bureaucrat  for  the
province for three decades, argued that in addition to being a minority population with
limited  resources,  the  reason  the  Muslim  community  was  behind  other  religious
communities developmentally and unable to run schools in the past, was the high level of
internal conflict within the community17.
29 The  new  leader  of  Congolese  Muslims  for  Kisangani  is  a  member  of  the  younger
generation and was elected as a result of the national General Assembly in early 2009.
According  to  him,  the  reason the  Muslim community  did  not  previously  have  more
development projects, such as schools, was a generational conflict18. In his description of
the situation, the older generation was not interested in development, but the younger
generation  has  now  taken  over  power  and  with  that  will  come  an  emphasis  on
advancement. He characterizes the conflict as between the elders who never left Congo
and the youth who went abroad to study. He notes that these youth, like himself, return
with an interest in trying to change local practices. For example, he recounts that it used
to be that if someone fell ill and it was believed to be because of bad spirits, then the
custom  was  to  pay  leaders  for  healing  prayers.  Instead  the  foreign-educated  youth
advocate that if someone falls ill they should receive prayers for free and be taken to a
hospital for treatment. So the returned theologians are part of a campaign against old
African traditions, such as paying for healing prayers.
30 The new leader notes that as a result of the new messages being preached, they have had
overwhelming support from younger generations and as such the majority of Kisangani
Muslims  are  no  longer  supporting  the  leadership  of  their  elders.  Some of  the  older
generation have expressed anger at the new teachings and have said that as a result their
livelihoods  are  being  threatened.  His  portrayal  of  the  situation  in  Kisangani  where
challenges  to  the  established  historical  leadership  are  met  with  resistance  reflects
parallel dynamics of generational divisions among other Islamist movements in Africa
(Bonate 2009; Østebø 2009; Soares & Otayek 2007; Westerlund & Evers Rosander 1997).
31 An  interesting  source  examining  the  internal  conflicts  within  the  local  Muslim
community is provided in a set of recent undergraduate theses and a Ph.D dissertation
emanating  from  the  University  of  Kisangani.  “The  Development  of  the  Muslim
Community in the City of Kisangani” laments that Muslims there have not experienced
social  and political  development because of  generational  conflict,  which it  efficiently
chronicles (Abedi Pene N’Koy 2006).  In another thesis on a similar topic, the internal
conflicts at the local level in Kisangani are situated within the broader context of conflict
at the national level, and the author argues that since its creation the national Muslim
association has not been able to realize its objectives because of “egotistical” conflicts of
interest among members of the ruling class (Oyoko 1999: 61). The author describes the
internal  conflict  among Kisangani Muslims as between,  “the class of  conservatives in
power, composed in majority by old persons” and “the class of youth who represent the
force of change and often translate the profound aspirations of the large majority” (ibid.:
78). The latter are for the most part marginalized from positions of power within the
national  Muslim  association,  and  instead  seek  to  engage  by  creating  their  own
organizations. However, these youth often feel frustrated at the little they are able to
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accomplish,  a sentiment also expressed by women’s groups who experience a similar
marginalization by the Muslim leadership. Making a Marxist argument, Oyoko points out
that the leadership maintains its  position of  power because it  controls  the means of
production in the community, namely the mosques where funds are collected for the
greater good of the community. His research highlighted that despite the large sums of
money  generated  at  the  mosques,  especially  during  the  most  important  religious
ceremonies, Muslims did not know how this money was being used.
32 Oyoko laments that the Muslim community of Kisangani has not been more of an engine
of development for the local population, and particularly in the education sector. He says
that blaming their underdevelopment in this area on the difficulties of Muslim children
receiving a proper education during the colonial period in Christian schools is no longer a
plausible excuse because today the Congolese state is secular and allows each religious
community the right to run schools (ibid.: 69).  However,  as evidence that the Islamic
leadership is not interested in the development of their community, Oyoko notes that in
Oriental province in the late 1990s there was only one functioning Muslim public school.
A consequence of the community’s lack of interest in schools has been a low level of
educated Muslim children. Oyoko cites a study by Hassan Bin Sefu Mukando in 1997 that
found that only eighteen percent of students in primary school and about nine percent of
children in secondary school were Muslim (ibid.: 71).  In conclusion,  Oyoko states,  “in
effect, the Islamic community of Kisangani is maintained in a situation of non-progress,
more  precisely  in  a  situation  of  under-development.  This  situation  is  the  primary
consequence of the exploitation of the victims who are the faithful Muslims on the part of
their  leaders”  (ibid.: 89).  These  two  groups  he  defines  like  many  others  as  being
distinguished according to generational, educational, and leadership characteristics.
33 A  sociology  dissertation  (Yuma  2004)  about  the  Congolese  Muslim  community  also
addresses the issue of internal conflicts and presents a history that reflects broader Sufi/
Reformist tensions. In this work, the leadership of the Muslim community in Oriental that
had been in power since 1987 was accused of poor management and lack of development
vision.  Therefore,  in the late  1990s,  several  Muslim intellectuals,  some of  whom had
received  theological  education  in  universities  in  Saudi  Arabia,  while  others  were
Congolese  university  students,  began  a  movement  to  denounce  the  community’s
stagnation and under-development (ibid.: 275). They organized meetings to educate local
Muslims about the problems and the need for a change in the leadership. The group
petitioned the leadership for reform of the organization’s governance several times, but
was continually refused.
34 When their requests remained unmet, the reformist group along with the majority of
Kisangani Muslims demanded that the provincial representative, whose title recognizes
him as the spiritual leader of the population, lead a Friday prayer at the central mosque
during Ramadan in 2001 as a test of his religious education. The leader was forced to
acquiesce, but his attempt demonstrated his lack of religious training, and, according to
the author, he was humiliated (ibid.). This incident was followed by expressions of anger
and more  attempts  at  reconciliation.  Finally  an  accord  was  signed between the  two
groups that called for both parties to convene a provincial council to tackle demands for
leadership change.  The older  leadership boycotted this  meeting they had pledged to
attend, so reformists used the opportunity to elect a new leadership for the province
comprised  primarily  of  Muslim intellectuals.  In  2004  at  the  time of  his  writing,  the
contestation  for  the  Oriental  leadership  between  the  old  committee  and  the  new
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committee continued, with each group working separately according to their goals. This
stalemate  continued  until  the  intervention  of  the  2009  national  General  Assembly
elections to be discussed in a later section.
35 Finally, a recent thesis specifically on the topic of conflict within the Kisangani Muslim
population from 2000 to 2004 finds that a major source of tension was the relationship
between Muslim preachers  who earned a  diploma in  Islamic  theology from an Arab
university  and other  religious  leaders  who were educated in Qur’anic  schools  in  the
Maniema province without earning a diploma (wa Kamwanga 2005). In order to test his
perception of the conflict with other Muslims in the community, the author conducted a
series  of  surveys  in  Kisangani.  When  he  asked  the  reason  for  the  conflict  in  their
community, the plurality of ordinary Muslims (26%) and elites (36%) said the division was
according to tribe, friendship group, or education group (ibid.: 32-34). When asked what
they thought to be the cause of conflict within the Muslim organization, the plurality of
non-elite Muslims (18%) responded because of material interest, while the plurality of
elites  (19%)  responded  because  of  ethnicity  (ibid.: 37-39).  Interestingly,  few  or  none
responded  a  conflict  of  generations,  which  seems  to  be  the  most  prominent  reason
proposed by scholars of the subject. Out of seventy elites questioned, not one said the
conflict was the result of a generational divide, while only three non-elites out of 130
responded thus (ibid.). Then, wa Kamwanga asked respondents whom they believed to be
the principal actors involved in these conflicts. The plurality of non-elites (34%) and elites
(39%) responded that it was amongst the authorities of Muslim association (ibid.: 41-44).
Again he questioned about the generational narrative and found that six percent each of
non-elites and elites said the conflict was the result of elders against the youth (ibid.).
36 Thus,  wa  Kamwanga  concludes  that  the  conflict  in  Kisangani  is  less  a  generational
dispute,  and more of  an ethnic  dispute.  The “ethnic” groups are defined as  arabisés,
descendants from those close to the original Swahili-Arab colonizers, and non arabisés. In
his search for a logical explanation of ethnic conflict, the author argues that there are
two primary reasons for this division. The first is historical dating back to when the Arabs
were present and recruited certain members among their domestic servants to be trained
in Islamic theology. This caused trouble in the contemporary era when, “faced with a new
generation of preachers trained in theological university, the old ruling preachers took a
defensive  attitude  in  order  to  maintain  their  power”  (ibid.: 49).  The  second  is
contemporary  issues,  including  material  interest,  ethnicity,  educational  level,  and
fanaticism. Some of the former leaders do not have an adequate level of instruction,
believe they have a mandate for life, and use their positions of power for personal gain
and nepotism. As a result, the longtime leadership responded to the threat on their power
by creating a new mosque, which solidified the clear division of the community.
37 These sources clearly demonstrate a local understanding that the Muslim community of
Kisangani has experienced a recent history of internal division, particularly since the
1990s, but disagreement on the fundamental basis of the division. However, what is clear
is that the division in Kisangani, like that in Maniema and elsewhere in Muslim Africa, is
at the core a tension between Sufi/traditionalists and Reformers. A younger generation of
Reformists has demanded a leadership change away from the older generation or arabisés.
The  younger  generation  as  described  here  easily  resembles  the  broader  Islamist
movement, as they are led by local Muslims who have studied abroad, criticize the lack of
true Islamic understanding of the older group,  and agitate for an increased focus on
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development projects. Given these local dynamics in Maniema and Oriental provinces,
how have such internal conflicts been reflected at the national level?
 
National Discord: The Case of COMICO
38 Not surprisingly, these conflicts on the local and provincial level also reflect the larger
internal  conflicts  present  at  the national  level  within the Communauté islamique en
République démocratique du Congo (COMICO). Founded in 1972 at the request of President
Mobutu, the COMICO is the principal organization of Congolese Muslims, headquartered in
Kinshasa with subunits at the provincial and local levels. COMICO has been plagued by
internal conflict since its inception, as divergent groups sought dominance in the new
unitary organization. These disputes produced a long period of stalemate from 1988 until
2004,  when there were two conflicting groups of  Muslims at  the national  level,  each
headed by a prominent personality claiming to be the true head of COMICO. The opposing
leaders were Sheikh Gamal Lumumba, who studied Islamic theology in Saudi Arabia, and
a prominent businessman, Al Hadji Mudilo.
39 Although the split did not occur until 1988, the underlying conflict that led to such a
situation began much earlier.  From the organization’s  inception,  there  was  a  debate
about  how  the  community  would  best  be  served,  by  a  leader  who  was  financially
successful and could help the organization grow economically, or by a leader trained in
Islamic theology who could benefit the community spiritually. In 1961, Muslims began an
initiative to create a sole organization to represent the Islamic community. They met
again in early 1963 to appoint a provisional committee, which did not get along, so it was
decided that a Congress would be held in Kasongo in August 1963. There, the Islamic
Mission of Congo (MISCO) was created and the leaders selected were Yusuf Lusangi, the
vice president of the Muslim Welfare Society, Amir Jumaine, and three others. However,
it did not take long for division to emerge within the community, as a competing faction
led by religious leaders Mwinyi Selemani and Shabani Baruani expressed their support of
the new association but did not approve of Jumaine in a leadership role, describing him as
“incompetent  and  illiterate”  (Lazzarato  2001:  95).  Therefore,  another  meeting  was
convened in March 1964 in an attempt to settle the dispute. Selemani was supported by
some prominent Muslims and foreign delegates, while Jumaine and Lusangi received the
backing of the youth and Kasongo Muslims. The result was the election of Selemani, the
dissolution of MISCO, and the rejection of Jumaine because it was argued that the leader
should be able to read and write the Qur’an. A new unity conference was scheduled, but
was  never  held.  Although  these  attempts  at  organization  of  the  Muslim community
ultimately failed, the debate had not been settled, as was later evidenced during elections
for the national leader of COMICO.
40 In December 1971 the Congolese (Zaire at the time) autocrat, President Mobutu Sese Seko,
required  all  religious  organizations  to  create  one  sole  association,  reflecting  the
movement towards corporatist structures that were common at that time throughout
Africa. The Muslim community contained over twenty rival associations who decided to
meet at a General Assembly in Kisangani from February 9-11, 1972 in order to discuss the
community’s  response  to  the  law  (ibid.: 99).  The  new  assembly  began  by  dissolving
preexisting organizations and creating the Islamic Community in the Republic of Zaire (
COMIZA).  The organization,  which later became COMICO when the country changed its
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name back to the D.R. Congo, is hierarchical with units at four levels reflecting the state
structure: the local community, the region, the province, and the country. They elected
Sheikh Amrani ben Juma as the Legal Representative and five assistants who had been
leaders of some of the recently dissolved associations. Not surprisingly, this leadership
cohort did not manage well  with one another.  As a result,  one of the five assistants,
Sheikh Ali Kabonga convoked an extraordinary session of the assembly in 1974 to elect a
new leader (Yuma 2004: 73). There, Sheikh Hassani ben Sabiti was elected as the new
leader, but the assembly was not formally recognized by the state and many Muslims
(Lazzarato 2001: 100).
41 Therefore, the Muslim community convened another assembly in Kinshasa in October of
that year, but it ended after two weeks of indecision. Finally, in early December 1974 a
group of about two-thirds of the members met and elected Sheikh Hassani ben Sabiti,
who came from a long line of Kisangani Muslims dating back to the arrival of the Arabs,
as their leader (Yuma 2004: 73). The Muslim community considered him to be very good
for their unity, as he worked to improve relations by travelling to other Arab nations,
attended the Assembly of the World Muslim League in Saudi Arabia in 1975, received
pledges of foreign aid for Zairian Muslims, and assistance for many to go on pilgrimage to
Mecca (Lazzarato 2001: 100-101; Yuma 2004: 74). Despite these successes by the first two
religious-oriented leaders of COMICO (Sheikh Amrani Djuma from 1972-1974 and Sheikh
Hassan  Sabiti  Mafuta  Mingi  from 1974-1978),  others  were  very  critical  of  spiritually
trained  leaders,  whom  they  accused  of  wasting  funds,  lacking  rigor  in  financial
management, and the inability to adequately organize the administration.
42 In 1978, the disagreement regarding the national leadership led to the convocation of an
extraordinary assembly to elect a new chief, this time a Muslim businessman Al Hadji
Tambwe Abedi Kauzeni,  who stayed in his role until  1988. According to the Assistant
Secretary General, some Muslims believed that Sheikhs experienced a leadership problem
because  their  narrow  theological  training  did  not  equip  them  for seeking  close
relationships with the central state and outside communities and that they held a small
vision for the community19. Yuma (2004) also notes that Tambwe was elected because the
community believed that they needed a businessman to lead since the theologians in
charge in the 1970s had been too concerned with religious priorities and did not have
management skills. One perspective suggests that Tambwe was elected only because of
his wealth,  and that he proceeded to waste his money on maintaining power,  to the
detriment of true development of the broader Muslim community (wa Kamwanga 2005:
29). However, Oyoko (1999: 62) notes that since the death of the businessman Al Hadji
Tambwe, the conflicts between those who prefer a spiritual imam or businessman did not
dissipate, and no group was able to win over the other one.
43 Since Tambwe’s leadership did not fare much better, the proponents of religious training
managed to secure the passage of a statute stipulating that only those with theological
training could become Legal Representative, leading to the election of another theologian
(Yuma 2004: 74). Al Hadji Tambwe’s term was followed by that of Sheikh Gamal Lumumba,
who was the official leader of COMICO from 1988-1990 (and again from 1996-2004). In 1990
Gamal’s term was suspended and his assistant Al Hadji Mudilo wa Malemba took over the
position  and  was  reelected  for  a  second  term.  Sheikh  Gamal  did  not  approve  of  the
situation and sought resolution in the Congolese judicial  system. The Supreme Court
ultimately ruled in favor of Gamal, leading to his return to leadership in 1996. However,
members of his cabinet and others refused to recognize Gamal as the true leader and
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instead continued to follow Al Hadji Mudilo. This stalemate of most Congolese Muslims
recognizing Mudilo as the leader, while the outside world and the Congolese government
recognized the leadership of Gamal continued until the elections in 2004.
44 This extended period of internal leadership crisis meant that the Muslim community
experienced very little in terms of  unity and development.  According to the current
Assistant Secretary General, the split within COMICO’s leadership directly impacted the
community’s ability to get involved in development in several ways. For example, the
Islamic Development Bank of Saudi Arabia had funded many projects for the Muslim
population of Congo over the years. However, when the community was divided the Bank
decided  to  stop  sending  assistance.  This  explanation,  however,  may  ignore  more
fundamental causes; one local thesis on the subject of the Muslim community noted that
the reason the Arabs suspended their aid to Congo was not necessarily political, but the
result of the devastating war which started in the country in 1996 (wa Kamwanga 2005:
55).
45 In addition, the Congolese state did not have good relations with the community during
this period either; primarily because it was difficult to know which group they should
work with. For example, a Sheikh currently building an educational complex in Kisangani
consisting of private primary, secondary, and Qur’anic schools with assistance from the
Islamic  Development  Bank  described  how  Muslims  had  been  marginalized  by  the
government. He claimed that when Muslims try to speak to Congolese authorities about
development projects, the latter do not really listen to their requests, but instead say that
because  the  Muslim community  is  separated by  internal  conflicts,  they  should  focus
instead on becoming united, and then come back to ask the state for assistance20. These
experiences have perhaps reinforced the desire for collective action and to encourage the
unity of the minority community in recent years.
46 However, the Muslim community has also known periods of very good relations with the
central state, especially during portions of Mobutu’s reign. To a large extent the genesis
of better relations was President Mobutu’s speech about the tensions between Egypt and
Israel at the United Nations in 1973 (Oyoko 1999: 81). Arab countries appreciated Zaire’s
position  of  support  and  responded  by  providing  financial  aid  to  the  country,  and
particularly for the Muslim community. Mobutu then paid for the Islamic leadership to go
on pilgrimage to Mecca around 1977. Mobutu’s actions during this period fit into his
broader plan of consolidating power in the single-party state by co-opting the Muslim
community, as well as using good relations with that community to bolster political and
financial  support for his regime from Arab countries.  However,  the financial  support
earmarked for the Muslim community, according to Oyoko, did not reach its intended
beneficiaries, with the exception of those within the Muslim leadership whom Mobutu
sought to co-opt, ultimately resulting in religious authorities that appeared to care more
about national politics than their minority community (ibid.: 82).
47 The deepening patronage relationship between the Muslim leadership and the Mobutist
state provided a key source of the mounting division within the Muslim community. As
other Muslims sought positions of leadership and benefits from Mobutu’s patronage, acts
of  opposition toward religious authorities sanctioned by the authoritarian state were
labeled as acts of defiance to the Party. As a result, several acts of protest by Muslims
toward their leadership were stifled by the intervention of state security apparatuses,
apparently  leading to  the  sequestering,  intimidation,  and assimilation of  such actors
(ibid.). Therefore what COMIZA accomplished during the Mobutu period was the unity of
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the  Muslim  community,  but  brought  about  by  force  rather  than  consensus,  while
suppressing deeper divisions. Another unintended consequence of the organization in its
early years was the extension of clientelism, very prevalent in state apparatuses, into the
Islamic community. Writing a decade ago, Oyoko decried the problems of the Muslim
community as largely the fault of internal divisions that played out at the national level
in leadership struggles.
48 One of the largest consequences of the lack of unity of the Congolese Muslim community,
frequently  expressed  by  informants,  is  that  Islam has  had  very  little  impact  in  the
development,  advancement,  and  rebuilding  of  the  Congolese  community  during  the
decades of state decay and war. The author of a local thesis on the Muslim community
concluded,  “at  the  national  level  Islam  lost  its  credibility  especially  on  the  plan  of
development and is  almost absent in all  activities,  first  in the institutions ruling the
country, in the government, in the institutions charged with the transition, even in the
independent electoral commission, and even at the local level Islam is not represented
when the other communities are represented” (wa Kamwanga 2005: 59). However, despite
these  gripping  internal  conflicts  within  the  national  Muslim organization  from  its
inception in 1974 until 2004, there has been a radical recent change within the Islamic
community.
 
The Contemporary Muslim Community: New
Leadership and Mobilization
49 The bleak portrait of the Muslim minority of Congo presented thus far in their history of
marginalization and deep internal division at local, regional, and even national levels is in
fact not reflective of the community today. In the post-war period, the community enjoys
much closer relations with the government and has witnessed much reconciliation from
crippling  internal  conflicts.  This  change  began  at  the  COMICO General  Assembly  in
February 2004, where members from all over the country elected a new leader Sheikh
Abdallah Mangala who was recognized by all, bringing an end to almost two decades of
leadership stalemate. The new leader is also someone who has encouraged the role of the
Muslim community in development and is both trained in Islamic theology, as well as
educated in modern sciences and speaks fluent French. Congolese Muslims have most
likely been able to unite around his leadership because he possesses both of the traits
they value the most, unlike his predecessors who excelled in only one area. The most
recent COMICO General Assembly, which is held every five years, was in February 2009.
There the incumbent leader Sheikh Mangala was re-elected to a second five-year term.
50 In addition to the importance of having one leader for the community, as opposed to the
previous period of division, it is crucial to recognize that Sheikh Mangala is a Reformist.
The election of a Reformist to the chief position beginning in 2004 also ushered in a new
Reformist leadership at the provincial and local levels. As discussed previously, the two
competing groups of Muslims of Kisangani were in a stale mate since the 1990s. However,
this was to change as a result of the elections of the national general assembly in 2009.
According to an informant, only two representatives of the older generation of Kisangani
attended the national meeting, as contrasted with five from the younger group21. In fact,
he stated, this was representative of the delegations arriving from all over the country. Of
the two hundred eighty members present for the assembly, two hundred twenty of them
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were members of the youth/reformist camp. He related that the reason for this was that
funding for plane tickets and travel to the capital usually comes from Arab countries, but
that it  did not arrive that year because the Arabs were tired of the internal fighting
within the Congolese Muslim community. The older generation reportedly continued to
wait for funding to arrive, while the youth camp mobilized personal resources to make
the trip.  As a result,  they were a clear majority and used their votes to elect young
development-oriented leaders to positions within the COMICO organization all over the
country.
51 Of course this victory by one segment of the Muslim community has been met with some
opposition from the Sufi/traditional/older group. However, because the new leadership
was elected through democratic means, the older group has a chance to regain prominent
positions at the next assembly in five years time. Opposition was most apparent in the
Maniema  province,  where  although Kindu  is  the  capital  for  governmental  purposes,
because of its religious majority and heritage Kasongo is the provincial capital for the
Muslim community. The former Secretary General expressed his concern that because of
the controversy over the new leaders selected by the national assembly in Kinshasa in
2009, there was a chance that the internal conflict, which had seemed to be diminishing,
could resurface22.
52 Prior to the General Assembly, a provincial assembly was held in Kasongo as usual to elect
representatives  to  attend  the  national  meeting.  However,  as  recounted  by  the  BIDH
president, this proved very complicated23. The former provincial leader, who had recently
passed away, had an assistant whom he did not care for and had appointed someone else
to  become  his  successor,  but  the  assistant  contested  this  move.  When  the  Muslim
community of  Kasongo tried to organize its  assembly,  the assistant refused to come,
stating that those who opposed his candidacy were organizing the assembly. Since certain
members  had boycotted  the  provincial  council,  its  resolutions  were  annulled  by  the
national assembly who, in the absence of accredited input from the provincial council,
elected the assistant to become the new leader.
53 Several  months after  the General  Assembly meeting,  the five representatives  for  the
Muslim association in the Kasongo area met to give their trimester reports24. There was
debate and concern expressed about what was happening in the organization at all levels
with a substantial leadership change. However, there was consensus that regardless of
what  was  happening  in  the  organization  at  provincial  and  national  levels,  the  local
representatives had a responsibility to continue their work. Those presenting these fears
and disillusion with the 2009 elections in Kasongo were primarily members of the older
generation who had been in power for a substantial amount of time, and it makes perfect
sense that they would not be overjoyed by this uprooting of their power.
54 The new Muslim leader for Maniema is a Tariqa member, but also represents reform
because he is from the younger generation and well educated. In the perspective of the
president of a Muslim women’s association headquartered in Kindu, a lot of good will
come from this change in leadership25. She viewed 2009 as the year of young Muslim men
gaining positions of power, and views this as a positive change because these new leaders
are educated both in a secular system and speak fluent French, also have good Qur’anic
training, and are advocating for the advancement of their minority community.
55 There is much hope that because of the new leadership of the Reformist elements of the
Muslim community, a development agenda will emerge. Overall the Muslim community is
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much more able to unite for collective action as a result of the decisive victory of a new
leadership  at  national  and  provincial  levels.  Members  of  Muslim  civil  society  and
development associations in Kisangani said that they have noticed a big change since the
last General Assembly because the newly elected Muslim intellectuals are encouraging
the community’s involvement in development26.
56 Today, despite the history of division, the Congolese Muslim community boasts a variety
of organizations. The proliferation of associations did not only occur within the Muslim
community or only in Congo, but “with political liberalization and greater freedom of
association, new forms of associational life began to flourish in Africa. Suddenly, national
Muslim  organizations  were  no  longer  the  only  officially  recognized  modern  Islamic
organizations, and  new  Islamic  associations  of  women,  youths,  and  students”,  were
formed (Soares & Otayek 2007: 12). However, the principal organization for Congolese
Muslims  remains  COMICO,  but  in  recent  years there  have  been  national  women’s
organizations created in conjunction with COMICO, including Comité national féminin de
COMICO (CONAFEM), and its affiliate at the provincial level COPROFEM.
57 There are other national women’s organizations with representatives at the provincial
level such as Union des femmes musulmanes du Congo (UFMC), which in Kisangani created
the Therapeutic Nutritional Center during the conflict period, and Fondation Zam-Zam,
which in Kindu runs a private Islamic primary school and literacy classes for uneducated
Muslim women.  Other  important  Muslim organizations  active  today in  the  Maniema
province  include  CFMUDEMA,  Ami  Santé  which is  an  association in  Kindu working  to
provide healthcare, Bureau islamique des droits humains (BIDH), over one-hundred thirty
Muslim  women’s  organizations  active  in  Southern  Maniema,  the  Dawa’tu  Islamiyya
organization of women from Mosque 18 in Kasongo, and Conseil national des droits de
l’homme  en  islam  (CONADHI).  In  Kisangani  one  finds  almost  a  dozen  more  Islamic
associations, particularly organizations focused on women and development.
58 The national, provincial, and local Muslim associations mentioned above focus on a wide
variety of tasks, whether spiritual or providing important services for their community
that the national state has been unable to provide. However, the realm in which Islamic
organizations have had the most visibility in the post-conflict era has been education.
Thanks  to  the  new  Reformist  leadership  and  calls  for  collective  action,  the  Muslim
community has received assistance in their educational endeavors from two key sources.
First is the return of international Muslim funding in recent years, as can be seen with
new school projects funded by the Islamic Development Bank in Kindu, Kisangani, and
Kinshasa. In addition to private schools,  mosques, and elementary Qur’anic schools,  a
large Qur’anic secondary school has been operating effectively at Mungomba (in between
Kasongo and Wamaza in southern Maniema)27.
59 Beyond these few international arrangements, the most significant change has been in
closer partnership between the minority community and the democratizing government.
The Congolese state has increasingly encouraged and financially supported the creation
and maintenance of an ever-expanding Islamic public school system. The provision of
education by  Muslim organizations  has  been a  very  recent  phenomenon.  Before  the
official end of the war in 2002, there were very few schools sponsored by the Islamic
community. The increasing involvement of the Muslim community in the provision of
education was not only repeatedly confirmed by in-depth interviews with members of the
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Muslim community as well as other citizens, but it was further bolstered by available
statistical evidence.
60 In the Maniema province the number of Islamic primary schools more than doubled, from
twenty-nine to seventy-six, from the school year 2003-2004 to 2008-2009. The same trend
can be seen with secondary schools, where the number increased from nineteen to forty-
two28.  In  addition,  this  trend  is  not  limited  to  the  Maniema province  but  reflects  a
national phenomenon. In the Oriental province the new coordinator for Islamic schools
since 2007 stated that when he began his job there were only ten Muslim schools in the
province,  but  only  two years  later  in  the 2008-2009 academic  year  this  number  had
expanded to  over  fifty29.  The  national  Muslim public  school  coordinator  in  Kinshasa
provided the  following  statistics:  for  the  academic year  2005-2006,  there  were three
hundred  sixty-eight  primary  and  one  hundred  forty-two  secondary  Islamic  schools
throughout the D.R. Congo. Only three years later during the 2008-2009 academic year,
the  Congolese  Muslim  community  was  running  over  eight  hundred  schools  in  the
country, about five hundred primary and three hundred secondary institutions30.
61 Religious public schools, or “convention” schools, are those that were created through
conventions signed between the Congolese state and representatives of the four main
religions, Catholic, Protestant, Kimbanguist, and Islamic. The latter was signed in 1979
between Mobutu’s government and COMICO, representing the Muslim community. In these
conventions,  the  state  has  agreed to  pay  teacher  and administrator  salaries,  set  the
national  curriculum,  and  monitor  schools  through  its  inspection  bureaucracy.  The
religious communities in turn have agreed to control the day-to-day operation of their
institutions  and  are  granted  permission  to  teach  a  religion  course.  Christian
organizations have been running convention schools in the Congo since colonial times,
but as the above statistics suggest, the Muslim community’s involvement in the public
education sector is a very recent phenomenon.
62 It  is  also  important  to  note  that  these  Muslim schools  are  not  madrasas,  but  public
institutions. Though the Muslim community is a minority population within Congo, the
new schools  being  created  are  not  catering  only  to  Muslim students,  and  therefore
provide a  service able  to be accessed by any Congolese child,  regardless  of  religious
affiliation. In fact, there are many teachers, directors, and other administrators involved
in the operation of these Islamic schools who are not Muslim. The coordinator for Islamic
schools in Maniema stated that perhaps fifty percent of children in their schools are
Muslim,  and  many  teachers  are  also  non-Muslim31.  This  brief  examination  of  the
proliferation of Muslim public schools in recent years has been presented here as an
indication that the Congolese Muslim minority is no longer marginalized and, as a result
of its new leadership’s increasing focus on collective action, is able to actively participate
in the education sector.
63 ❖
64 This article has discussed the Muslim minority community in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, from its experience of colonial brutality,  to the intense internal conflicts that
manifested  themselves  in  divergent  ways  in  various  locations,  and  finally  to  the
emergence of a Reformist leadership and the resulting engagement of the community in
associations and development in the recent post-conflict period. Although the specific
dynamics  present  in  the  Congo  are  a  direct  result  of  particular  local  politics  and
traditions, we can also see how they are intricately linked to international and national
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religious  and political  phenomenon.  For  example,  it  must  be  acknowledged that  the
partnership between Muslims and the state in education is in large part possible because
of an opportunity provided by various factors: a national political opening at the end of
President Mobutu’s thirty-two year autocratic rule, the formal end to two devastating
wars in 2002,  the beginning of  a  democratic  transition,  and paradoxically the state’s
continual weakness and lack of capacity to meet the needs of its citizens alone.
65 Beyond the national context, internal conflicts within Muslim communities are prevalent
both in minority and majority groups throughout the African continent. In particular,
Islamist/reform movements have encouraged the expansion of Muslim education systems
and attracted disenfranchised younger generations (Westerlund & Evers Rosander 1997;
Soares & Otayek 2007). Many of these youth focused on social mobility argued that their
Sufi traditional leaders did not have adequate training in Arabic and European national
languages,  which  made  collaboration  between  their  Muslim  communities  and
international  organizations  virtually  impossible  (Bonate  2009:  67).  Reformers  created
Muslim schools  throughout  Africa  so  that  Muslim children not  only  received proper
training in Islam, but also the skills they would need to succeed and get jobs in the local
context. So in countries like Congo where Islam is a minority, the Muslim schools train
children in French, in conjunction or instead of Arabic.
66 We began the discussion of internal conflicts within Muslim communities by alluding to
recent literature on the topic from across the continent, and this article seeks to further
nuance our understandings of Sufi/Reform debates.  In the Congolese case, the recent
leadership change within the COMICO organization reflects the growing importance of
Reformists in the form of the younger generation of Muslims and those advocating for
the Muslim community to actively engage in development. In Kisangani this group most
clearly resembles Islamist groups in other countries, as those educated in the Middle East
returned with a vision to rally the local younger generation to change the status quo of
rule by the less educated older generation. The internal fissures within the Maniema
Islamic community, including divisions between older and younger generations, Tariqa
and  Tawahidi,  and  natives  and  Arab  descendants,  demonstrate  that  local  dynamics
greatly impact the expression and nature of classic Sufi/reform divides. The example of
the Tariqa recently coming to power in the province on a reform platform provides
another example of the increasing blurring of our categories.
67 In conclusion,  conflicts  in the Congolese Islamic minority reflect  both a classic  Sufi/
Reformist distinction with its divergent local manifestations, as well as the particular case
of a minority community that experienced historic marginalization, then intense internal
conflicts,  but  has  recently  attempted  collective  action  in  order  to  more  effectively
mobilizing as a minority population.
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The history of  the Muslim minority community of  the Democratic  Republic  of  Congo can be
characterized as one of repression and marginalization, especially during Belgian colonialism.
Further  compounding  the  struggles  of  Congo’s  Muslim  minority  have  been  intense  internal
conflicts  within the community  in  the post-independence period.  This  strife  resembles  Sufi/
Reformist tensions in other parts of the continent, but with important variations at the local,
provincial,  and  national  levels  in  the  Congo.  However,  in  the  post-conflict  period  a  united
national leadership has emerged encouraging the proliferation of Islamic associations and their
role in post-war development. Perhaps most remarkable about the mobilization of the Muslim
minority  community  in  recent  years  has  been the role  of  the community  in  providing good
quality public education.
Résumé
L’histoire de la communauté musulmane minoritaire de la République démocratique du Congo
peut être caractérisée comme celle de la répression et de la marginalisation, surtout pendant la
colonisation belge. Ce qui a encore aggravé les luttes de cette minorité musulmane congolaise, ce
sont les  conflits  internes à la  communauté pendant la  période post-indépendance.  Ces luttes
s’apparentent aux tensions sufi/réformistes dans certaines parties du continent, mais avec des
variations importantes aux niveaux local,  provincial,  et national au Congo. Toutefois,  dans la
période de l’après-conflit, une direction nationale unie a émergé pour encourager la prolifération
des associations islamiques et leur faire jouer un rôle dans le développement d’après-conflit.
L’aspect  le  plus  remarquable  au  sujet  de  la  mobilisation  de  la  communauté  musulmane
minoritaire  au  cours  de  ces  dernières  années  est  peut-être  sa  contribution  à  fournir  une
éducation publique de qualité.
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